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New  technologies  must  be accompanied  by  institutional  change.  Innovative  actors  therefore  need  to  do
institutional  work  or  take  a role  as an  institutional  entrepreneur  in  order  to shape  the  institutions  in
the  best  interests  of their  technology.  However,  the  literature  on  system  building  and  on  institutional
entrepreneurship  have  little  overlap.  The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  bridge  these  two bodies  of literature  to
gain  additional  insights  into  how  institutional  change  evolves  in  a technological  innovation  system.  We
show  how  the  pharmaceutical  ﬁrm  Roche  acted  as  a powerful  institutional  entrepreneur  by inﬂuencing
®
nstitutional change
ersonalized medicine
ystem building
echnological innovation systems
the  health-care  system  in  England  to create  a  market  for  the personalized  cancer  drug  Herceptin .  We
demonstrate  that  institutional  change  can  be preceded  by a range  of innovation  system-building  activities
that  are  not  directly  intended  to bring  about  institutional  change  but are  required  in  order  for institutional
change  to take  place.  Through  this  case  study,  we  show  how  the  system-building  and  institutional  change
literature  can  complement  each  other.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The technological innovation system (TIS) framework has
merged over the past few years as an analytical tool to study the
ynamics of new and emerging technology ﬁelds (Carlsson et al.,
002; Edquist, 2005; Hekkert et al., 2007; Markard and Truffer,
008a). Rooted in evolutionary economics, it highlights the impor-
ance of dynamic interplay between institutional structures and the
arious groups of actors (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Carlsson
t al., 2002) that, together with technology and networks, are con-
idered key structural elements of innovation systems (Hellsmark,
010). Because the TIS framework was initially intended to be used
n conjunction with ﬁrm strategy literature in order to explain the
ystemic aspects of innovation and to derive recommendations for
olicy makers in their respective technological areas (Bergek et al.,
008; Hekkert et al., 2007; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), the major-
ty of TIS studies take a meso-level perspective.
Some authors in innovation studies have recently expressed
oncern about the lack of effort directed toward exploring how
icro-level activities by different innovating actors inﬂuence the
nnovation system (Hellsmark, 2010; Markard and Truffer, 2008a;
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 17684059527.
E-mail addresses: piret.kukk@isi.fraunhofer.de, piretkukk@hotmail.com
P. Kukk), e.h.m.moors@uu.nl (E.H.M. Moors), m.p.hekkert@uu.nl (M.P. Hekkert).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.01.016
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unlicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Musiolik et al., 2012). Because of this, the deliberate activities of
speciﬁc actors, or so-called system builders, are overlooked. They
are associated with a strong vision aimed at creating and shaping
the system in their own  interests (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009).
It is important to analyze these deliberate actor strategies for
system building in TIS studies in greater depth (Farla et al., 2012;
Truffer et al., 2012). Several studies have illustrated the importance
of entrepreneurs as prime movers (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991;
Hellsmark, 2010; Markard and Truffer, 2008a; Negro et al., 2007) in
shaping innovation systems, but we still lack insight in how actors
shape different innovation systems.
Some TIS scholars have taken a more actor-oriented approach
and analyzed the importance of deliberate activities of actors or
networks that commit themselves to system building as they
undertake different activities to support an emerging technol-
ogy (Cetindamar and Laage-Hellmann, 2002; Hellsmark, 2010;
Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009; Markard and Truffer, 2008a;
Musiolik and Markard, 2011). All these studies can be categorized as
system-building literature and build on the seminal work of Hughes
(1987).
Even though these studies are important, they have not provided
deeper insights into the mechanisms behind system building aimed
at institutional change.
Therefore in this article we highlight the process of system
building aimed at achieving institutional change. In general, insti-
tutional frameworks are not aligned with the needs of radical
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
 Policy
i
t
c
2
o
t
p
m
t
e
a
m
a
p
o
e
o
a
r
i
w
t
t
s
t
s
e
s
a
(
(
t
p
i
s
p
g
a
t
e
a
r
i
r
s
t
t
a
r
a
m
r
p
cP. Kukk et al. / Research
nnovation, and therefore institutional change is necessary. We
hus expect that activities related to institutional change in
ultural-cognitive, normative, or regulative institutions (Scott,
001), or in any combination of all three, are an important part
f system-building activities. Many papers in organization studies
heorize speciﬁcally on institutional change strategies. Com-
ared to system-building literature, organization studies is much
ore developed. For example, it distinguishes among different
ypes of actors behind institutional change, such as institutional
ntrepreneurship, in which a powerful heroic entrepreneur with
 lot of resources single-handedly changes institutional arrange-
ents (DiMaggio, 1988; Leca et al., 2008; Maguire et al., 2004),
nd the institutional work, in which institutional change takes
lace through many different types of activities by a wide variety
f actors that aim to achieve institutional change (Lawrence
t al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2004). Interestingly, the literature
n institutional change does not focus explicitly on innovation
nd technological change, nor does it explicitly take into account
elations between other forms of system-building activities and
nstitutional entrepreneurship or institutional work.
In this study, we aim to bridge the literature on system building
ith the literature on institutional entrepreneurship and institu-
ional work. By bringing mechanisms on institutional change into
he discussion, we contribute to a better understanding of actor
trategies in system building. Moreover, by showing how insti-
utional change strategies are related to broader system-building
trategies in the context of innovation, we also contribute to knowl-
dge on institutional change.
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights in different
ystem-building patterns by a powerful actor in a TIS that aim to
chieve institutional change.
Our main research questions are therefore:
1) Which system-building activities did the key actors undertake
to facilitate market approval and diffusion of their technolo-
gies?
2) How did the key actors deal with institutions that inﬂuenced
their technology, and which strategies did they implement
together with other stakeholders to shape the institutional
structures in the interest of their goal?
In order to study the importance of institutional change in
he context of broader system-building strategies, we focus on
ersonalized cancer medicine, a technological area of biomedical
nnovation in which technological and institutional change is
trongly interrelated.
Medicine is a highly regulated ﬁeld, in which bringing a new
roduct to market involves a lengthy institutional process to
uarantee its safety and quality. Personalized medicine represents
 new paradigm in health care and cancer treatment that enables
he provision of more effective treatments with fewer adverse
ffects for particular patients, based on their speciﬁc genetic char-
cteristics. Implementation of this innovative medical treatment
equires various signiﬁcant changes in the health-care sector. This
s because, unlike traditional cancer therapies (e.g., chemotherapy,
adiation, or surgery), personalized cancer drugs work only on
peciﬁc patients who can be identiﬁed using biomarker-based
esting. No other type of drug has required this kind of testing,
herefore, changes in treatment and testing protocols and routines
re needed. How these kinds of cognitive institutional changes
egarding diagnosis are implemented is therefore crucial for the
doption of personalized medicine. The concept of personalized
edicine also challenges regulators concerning the alignment of
egulatory institutions involved in approval and reimbursement
olicies to assess the costs and beneﬁts of this new and expensive
ombination of drugs and diagnosis within health care, considering 45 (2016) 1558–1569 1559
that resources are not unlimited. Such a transmission process in
medical innovation from scientiﬁc discovery to new products and
services (i.e., the adoption of personalized medicine) depends on
cognitive changes in institutions and a learning curve in hospital-
based medical practices (Morlacchi and Nelson, 2011; Nelson et al.,
2011) and patient preferences and competence (Windrum and
García-Gon˜i, 2008).
The fundamental role of hospitals in innovation systems in
the delivery of health care has been highlighted in earlier litera-
ture (Metcalfe et al., 2005). The clinical trials to test new cancer
drugs take place in cancer centers that are usually part of large
university research hospitals. These trials in drug development
are run by principal investigators, medical oncology specialists
employed by the hospitals. The majority of cancer treatment, such
as monoclonal antibodies in personalized medicine, are delivered in
hospitals intravenously, exclusively under the supervision of onco-
logists. Hospitals are the hubs of clinical practice. They not only
are service providers but also contribute to biomedical innovation
and, together with patients, are the key adopters of new medical
technologies.
Therefore as we  analyze institutional entrepreneurship by a
large and resourceful pharmaceutical ﬁrm, we are also analyzing
the role of hospitals and patient organizations as key stakehol-
ders in institutional change related to the use in England of the
personalized breast cancer drug Herceptin®.
Compared to other Western European countries, England has
a complex and demanding institutional environment for gaining
market access for drugs, such as an independent drug regulatory
agency. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) has long, detailed, and evidence-based assessment proce-
dures in place to guarantee the effectiveness and cost beneﬁt of
new drugs. This proved problematic in the adoption of personalized
medicine in hospitals at the beginning of 2000 (Wilking et al., 2009).
However, the country has undergone signiﬁcant improvement over
the years, which makes England an interesting case study. We  want
to understand how the key actors (i.e., the manufacturer, hospitals,
and patient groups) operated in this difﬁcult institutional envi-
ronment in order to overcome the systemic hurdles they faced at
the beginning of the market introduction of Herceptin® and which
approaches they took to overcome the underdeveloped key pro-
cesses in the system.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section
starts with a brief description of the technological innovation
system, system building, and institutional entrepreneurship liter-
ature and explains our analytical framework. Section 3 addresses
the methodology. A description of Herceptin® and the problems
involved in its adoption are elaborated in Section 4. Section 5 offers
the results of an empirical analysis of our framework. Section 6
concludes.
2. Theoretical background
This paper departs from the innovation system (IS) concept as it
offers a suitable framework for analyzing the dynamics and growth
of a system involving novel technologies or products (Carlsson et al.,
2002; Edquist, 2005; Hekkert et al., 2007).
The central idea behind the IS approaches is that the determi-
nants of any technological change are found also in a broader social
structure around entrepreneurs (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991;
Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992), which means that ﬁrms do not
innovate in isolation (Edquist, 1997) but, rather, are part of a larger
context that can be deﬁned as an IS (Lundvall, 1992).A technological innovation system (TIS) is part of the wider IS
concept and focuses on a speciﬁc technology. It is deﬁned as “a set of
networks of actors and institutions that jointly interact in a speciﬁc
technological ﬁeld and contribute to the generation, diffusion and
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tilization of variants of a new technology and/or new product”
Markard and Truffer, 2008b, p. 611).
In addition to structural components, a process perspective
f TIS has been developed to enhance the analytical framework
Bergek et al., 2008; Hellsmark, 2010). It highlights the interactions
f actors and institutional structures in a speciﬁc ﬁeld of technology
Carlsson et al., 2002; Markard and Truffer, 2008a), and a number
f key processes that have been identiﬁed need to operate suc-
essfully in a well-functioning system (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert
t al., 2007; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). The focus on processes
s a relatively new addition to the TIS approach (Suurs et al., 2009;
an Alphen et al., 2010) used to analyze system dynamics and to
ompare system performance (Hekkert et al., 2007; Truffer et al.,
012).
However, as Markard and Truffer (2008a) highlighted, TIS stud-
es base their analysis on the system level. This is because the IS
ramework was intended to be used in conjunction with business
trategy literature to explain the systemic aspects of innovation for
olicy making (Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004;
aubahar, 2006). The concern is that, if such a focus is used, the
ommunity might overlook the role of actors and actor groups at
 micro level in the creation and functionality of a TIS (Farla et al.,
012; Hellsmark, 2010; Markard and Truffer, 2008a). Neither pays
ttention to the deliberate activities of speciﬁc actors in the cur-
ent TIS framework, who are associated with a strong vision and
nterest in shaping the system or its institutional structure accord-
ng to their interests (Hellsmark, 2010; Hellsmark and Jacobsson,
009). Therefore TIS is not always just a heuristic construct cre-
ted for analytical purposes (Bergek et al., 2008; Carlsson et al.,
002; Edquist, 2004) but, rather, a real system with structural ele-
ents and actors dedicated to system development (Hughes, 1979;
ughes, 1987; Musiolik, 2012).
This kind of system building by dedicated actors is about the
trategic creation or modiﬁcation of institutional and organiza-
ional structures (Musiolik et al., 2012), in order to “address system
eaknesses, to reduce further uncertainties and to strengthen
he TIS” (Hellsmark, 2010, p. 48). These kinds of system-building
trategies depend heavily on the availability of resources and the
xisting socio-technical systems (Farla et al., 2012) in pursuing
ore favorable conditions to develop and spread the adoption of
ew technologies and products (Garud and Karnøe, 2001; Hughes,
979; Van de Ven, 1993).
Some studies have looked at the role of speciﬁc actors in TIS
unctionality: Cetindamar and Laage-Hellmann (2002) conducted
 comparative analysis of a company’s impact on the performance
f clusters. Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) analyzed the extent
o which an individual has the capacity to inﬂuence the forma-
ion of a TIS. They addressed the individual as a system builder
ith “transformative capacity” on the TIS. Following this, Musiolik
t al. (2012) analyzed the role of networks as system builders in
uel cell-based TIS in Germany. The concept of system building is
onsidering all possible key processes involved in system building
nd therefore offers valuable insights from an actor-oriented per-
pective on creating innovation systems by analyzing the role and
ransformative capacity of speciﬁc actors as system builders. How-
ver, the TIS community would beneﬁt from further insights into
he precise evolution of the process of change, the typical system-
uilding patterns, the order of speciﬁc key processes, and how they
einforce one another to change the system.
As highlighted in previous work, actors may  also deliber-
tely change or adapt existing institutions or create new ones
Markard and Truffer, 2008a), and these kinds of institutional
hange activities have a positive correlation with the degree of
nstitutionalization of the ﬁeld (Beckert, 1999). According to North
1994, p. 361), “institutions are the rules of the game, organi-
ations and their entrepreneurs are the players.” This relates to 45 (2016) 1558–1569
the long-standing debate on structure versus agency in the social
sciences community (Leca et al., 2008). Scientiﬁc discussion over
how structures and agencies actually interact is ongoing. Earlier
work found that structures (institutions) should be privileged
over agency, and therefore institutional change was seen as a
result of an exogenous stimulus (Leca et al., 2008). The contrary
view that institutions are the result of different activities by the
actors (Dolfsma and Verburg, 2005) is much better equipped to
deal with institutional change, because it emphasizes the role
of actors. The literature on institutional entrepreneurship is one
institutional theory that beneﬁts from detecting endogenous
reasons for institutional change (Leca et al., 2008).
The literature on institutional entrepreneurship is useful for
conceptualizing the role of system builders in institutional change
in an innovation system (Leca et al., 2008). It analyzes speciﬁc
activities “of actors who have an interest in particular institutional
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institu-
tions or to transform existing one” (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657).
According to Weik (2011), institutional entrepreneurs can be cat-
egorized into three groups based on the type of activities in which
they are interested in undertaking: (1) creators of new institutions;
(2) destroyers of existing institutions; and (3) those interested
in changing established institutions. Institutional entrepreneur-
ship as initially introduced by DiMaggio (1988) is about heroic
entrepreneurs who are able to change institutions. He introduced
the term institutional entrepreneur to characterize actors or actor
groups with adequate resources to contribute to the creation of
new institutions or change the existing ones in which they expect
to be “an opportunity to realize interest that they value highly”
(DiMaggio, 1988, p. 14).
Other frameworks closely related to institutional entrepreneur-
ship encompass what entrepreneurs or actors do in general to
create or change institutional settings, such as institutional work
(Lawrence et al., 2011), which focuses on micro-level activities
that are aimed at achieving institutional change. According to
Lawrence, institutional work “describes the practices of individual
and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining and disrup-
ting institutions” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Compared
to institutional entrepreneurship, institutional work concentrates
more on diverse forms of agency and activities that contribute to
institutional change (Lawrence et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2004).
Its main interest is “work” as such—all the different activities (cre-
ating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions) that actors or actor
groups can engage in regarding institutional structure (Lawrence
et al., 2011). Institutional work studies how and why  the activi-
ties in support of institutional change occur, and with what effect,
by focusing on distributed agency: how coordinated and unco-
ordinated efforts by a large number of different actors lead to
institutional change (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). The focus of
institutional work is on practice and process and not only the out-
come, as in institutional entrepreneurship, which diverts attention
from one dominant institutional entrepreneur (Lawrence et al.,
2011).
Because the literature on institutional change is theoreti-
cally more developed than that of system building, it also has a
more systemic overview of how change evolves. As proposed by
Tolbert and Zucker (1996), institutionalization can be seen as a
three-step process of consecutive phases: (1) habitualization, (2)
objectiﬁcation, and (3) sedimentation. The ﬁrst step, also called
a pre-institutional stage, is characterized by unstable structures,
a low level of coordination, and a lack of legitimacy for the
innovation, a low level of knowledge, and the absence of routine
use of the technology. The second step involves increased social
consensus, for example, legitimacy among decision makers and
accelerated adoption (of the technology). The last step means
full institutionalization, characterized by wide acceptance by all
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he actors involved (possible adopters) to assure the long-term
ontinuation of the relevant structures (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).
Scott (2001) has proposed that the process of institutionali-
ation be organized as three separate “pillars” needed for a stable
nstitutional structure: cultural-cognitive, regulative, and normat-
ve systems. According to Scott (2001): (1) cultural-cognitive
ystems are represented by shared identities, common beliefs, and
ogics; (2) regulative systems are the laws and regulations by exec-
tive and legislative bodies that are needed for formal legitimacy;
nd (3) social expectations, values, and norms by professional asso-
iations (e.g., lobby or patient groups) that constitute normative
ystems.
. Methodology
We  chose to study the importance of system building in general
nd on institutional change in particular regarding the diffusion of
erceptin® in TIS in England for the following reasons.
First, Herceptin® is one of the ﬁrst biomedical personalized
reast cancer drugs developed that has the potential to signiﬁcantly
mprove treatment outcomes. The implementation of Herceptin® is
hallenging the regulators with respect to the alignment of regula-
ory institutions involved in approval and reimbursement policies
ecause, as a new combination of diagnosis and drugs, it requires
he development of innovative pricing and reimbursement policies.
he implementation of this ﬁrst personalized medicine for cancer
lso calls for cognitive institutional change to transform the over-
ll medical-care protocol for breast cancer patients. As an example
f an important biomedical innovation, it represents an emerging
echnological ﬁeld that can cut across established professional and
rganizational boundaries and disrupts established medical routi-
es and treatment protocols in hospitals (Christensen, 2000; Swan
t al., 2007) by changing various established institutions. Because
 majority of radical medical innovations require new institutional
tructures, we expected in advance that institutional change would
lay an important role in the creation of a market for the Herceptin®
IS, considering that personalized medicine is an entirely new
aradigm in cancer treatment that the existing health-care system
nd the various actors involved have not yet adopted.
Second, until now TIS scholars have dedicated most of their
fforts to the energy sector (Truffer et al., 2012). Other sectors
ith different characteristics, such as pharmaceuticals, which is
ne of the world’s most highly regulated, have not gained as much
ttention. Therefore, an exploratory single case study was worth
onducting in this sector.
Third, the adoption of this drug in England presents an interest-
ng case for analysis because, compared to other Western European
ountries, England has a supportive environment for biomedi-
al innovation: it has excellent research facilities, internationally
ecognized pharmaceutical companies, and a sufﬁcient supply of
able 1
xamples of event classiﬁcation according to system-building activity (based on TIS funct
EVENTS around Herceptin® Entrepreneurial
activities
Knowledge
creation
Regulatory approval by EMA  
Positive assessment by NICE 
Collaboration between Roche and Dako
to develop companion diagnostic
x
Reimbursement decision by NHS 
Beginning of the HERA clinical trial x
New scientiﬁc evidence published
about phase III clinical trials
Launch of governmental Cancer Strategy
Meeting organized about Herceptin 
Supportive political statement 
ote: EMA  = European Medicine Agency; NICE = National Institute of Clinical Excellence; N 45 (2016) 1558–1569 1561
technology, scientists, and know-how (Swan et al., 2007). However,
the country also has a nationally distinctive, complex, and demand-
ing institutional environment with respect to market access for
personalized cancer drugs. This is mainly due to complex health
technology assessment procedures for new drugs, whose outcome
determines whether the cost of a drug will be covered by the
National Health Service (NHS) (Abelson and Collins, 2009). At the
beginning of 2000, the reimbursement and availability of these pro-
cedures initially proved highly problematic (Wilking et al., 2009).
However, at the beginning of the past decade, signiﬁcant insti-
tutional changes and improvements occurred in England that made
personalized medicine more widely available to patients. Therefore
institutional change was signiﬁcant in creating a market for such
drugs, and it made England an interesting case study of how these
changes took place over time and what the role of various stakehol-
ders was. The duration of this case is seven years, from 1999, when
Herceptin® came on to the market, until 2006, when the drug was
approved for the treatment of early-stage breast cancer.
The study employs a multi-level approach. First, we  identiﬁed
and mapped all the relevant actors, networks, and institutions
of the Herceptin® TIS in England. Empirical data were collected,
making use of different sources, such as scientiﬁc literature,
“gray” literature (professional journals, industry reports, policy
papers, and books), and various websites. Thereafter, using the
same sources, a qualitative event analysis was  conducted to trace
important developments in the case. In this event analysis, system-
level events related to the development and implementation of
Herceptin® in England over six years were identiﬁed and divided
into different system-building classes based on the system function
by Hekkert et al. (2007) (see Table 1). The classiﬁcation was veri-
ﬁed by another researcher to increase the validity of the primary
results. All the differences in the classiﬁcation were analyzed and
reclassiﬁed, if necessary. The results of the event analysis were used
to develop a narrative describing the evolution of the Herceptin®
innovation system in England.
We  complemented and developed our narrative further by con-
ducting 15 semistructured interviews with experts from different
stakeholder groups, such as industry, academia, medical practices,
nonproﬁt organizations, drug regulators, and policy makers (see
Table 2). The experts interviewed were identiﬁed from Internet
searches, scientiﬁc articles, policy papers, and snowball sampling
using the criteria of being involved in or having profound knowl-
edge of the adoption or implementation of Herceptin® in England.
The interviews took place from November 2012 to March 2013.
We personalized the interview guide for each expert based on his
or her ﬁeld of expertise. To explore the different actor strategies
and understand their actual behavior and underlying motivations,
we asked the stakeholders a series of questions about the history
of the creation of the market for Herceptin® and the regulatory
environment of the market. We  asked them to identify the main
ions in Hekkert et al., 2007).
Knowledge
diffusion
Guidance of
search
Market
formation
Resource
mobilization
Creation of
legitimacy
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
HS = National Health Service; HERA = Herceptin Adjuvant Trial.
1562 P. Kukk et al. / Research Policy
Table 2
Overview of interviewees.
ID Role Date of interview (by phone)
a Industry executive 1-15-2013
b  Cancer charity representative 11-7-2012
c Public health professional 11-22-2012
d  Industry executive 12-7-2012
e  Industry executive 11-9-2012
f  Oncologist 12-3-2012
g  Health-care specialist 11-7-2012
h  Industry executive 1-28-2013
i  Industry executive 11-20-2012
j  Oncologist 11-29-2012
k  Oncology pharmacist 1-7-2013
l  Health economist 1-31-2013
s
l
t
t
b
f
b
v
i
a
i
4
i
c
H
s
2
c
F
Am  Oncologist 2-12-2013
n  Health economist 2-19-2013
o  Pathologist 3-7-2013
takeholders involved in the adoption of the technology, the prob-
ems they encountered, and how they were dealing with them. All
he interview results have been completely anonymized to pro-
ect the identities of the interviewed experts. The contradictions
etween the narrative and interview results were checked with
ollow-up interviews to gain additional insights. So, the interviews
ecame more reﬁned during the interview process. To increase the
alidity of the outcome, we also compared all our interview ﬁnd-
ngs against the results of the event database. If any contradictions
rose, we conducted additional searches to include all the possible
nformation sources studied.
. The development of the Herceptin® technological
nnovation system in England
The case study concerns the implementation of the breast can-
er drug Herceptin® in England from 1999 to 2006 (see Fig. 1).
erceptin® is a recombinant human monoclonal antibody that
peciﬁcally binds to the human epidermal growth factor receptor
 (HER2/neu), which is overexpressed in 25–30% of breast can-
er patients’ tumor cells (Slamon et al., 2001), thus hindering the
ig. 1. Key events regarding Herceptin® adoption in England.Note: ASCO = American So
gency; HER2 = human epidermal growth factor receptor 2; NHS = National Health Service 45 (2016) 1558–1569
growth of tumor cells. It is an example of a “personalized drug”
because, unlike traditional therapies (e.g., radiation, chemother-
apy), it does not affect all the cells but, rather, works on a speciﬁc
molecular target, which is present in only a subgroup of patients.
It is a very expensive drug: treatment with Herceptin® costs from
£20,000 to £30,000 per patient per year (Kroese et al., 2007), which
is equivalent to the average annual income in England.
Pharmaceuticals have one of the most highly institutionalized
markets, with high barriers to entry, in which products cannot
enter the market without approval by the relevant regulatory
authority (Netzer, 2006). Herceptin®, like all the other personal-
ized medicines in the European Union, ﬁrst had to be approved by
the European Medicine Agency (EMA) (Netzer, 2006). Only after the
European Commission (EC) licensed it based on EMA approval did it
become available for use. However, it was  not included in the NHS
coverage plan in England until after a positive opinion had been ren-
dered by the NICE. During the period from the EMA  approval to the
NICE assessment, the decision as to whether the NHS would cover
Herceptin® treatment for a given patient was made by local Pri-
mary Care Trusts (PCT) (i.e., administrative bodies in England, part
of the National Health Service and responsible for commissioning
primary and secondary health services) (Mayor, 2005a).
The ﬁrst part of the Herceptin® narrative covers the system-
building activities by the actors between the beginning of 2000,
when the drug was launched on the market for the treatment
of late-stage breast cancer, and 2002. The second part describes
the actors’ activities from 2003 until 2006, when Herceptin® was
launched for the treatment of early-stage breast cancer and its
aftermath.
4.1. Simultaneous launch of the NICE and Herceptin® TIS in
England
The NICE is an independent advisory body in England that
conducts assessments on the cost effectiveness of drugs as well as
their safety and clinical effectiveness (Paul and Trueman, 2001). It
directly affects whether the cost of a drug is covered by the NHS.
The establishment of the NICE just when Roche was preparing
ciety of Clinical Oncology; EC = European Commission; EMA  = European Medicine
; NICE = National Institute of Clinical Excellence; STA = Single Technology Appraisal.
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o submit Herceptin® for authorization approval (Fig. 1) put the
ompany in a complicated position regarding its system-building
trategy for the drug (Industry executive a and d). Clear approval
nd reimbursement policies drive the creation of a market for new
rugs, but this was not the case for Herceptin® because at the time
hat the company was conducting clinical trials in hospitals, the
ICE did not yet exist. The newly established NICE wanted Roche
o supply all the evidence documented upfront, which was much
ore data than any other national authority had ever requested
Industry executive a). Because the NICE’s speciﬁc requirements
n cost effectiveness were not known in advance, the particular
ealth economics type of data about this expensive drug during
he late-stage clinical trials had not been collected, because this
as not commonly done in the mid-1990s (Industry executive a).
nder these conditions, the NICE had to determine a reasonable
rice for improving and prolonging lives—something that had not
een done before either. Keeping these circumstances in mind, it
as evident that the NICE’s review of Herceptin® was going to be
 long and complicated institutional process.
In order to create market access for its drug, Roche took a num-
er of strategic steps (i.e., system-building activities) in support
f this process (see Table 3). Even though Roche was not able to
irectly inﬂuence the NICE’s assessment (i.e., regulatory institu-
ions), by taking these steps it was trying to ensure faster adoption
n hospitals once the drug received a positive assessment from the
ICE (Hedgecoe, 2004). In order to contribute to the diffusion of
nowledge about the drug and to create clinical experience with the
rug (i.e., cognitive institutions), Roche gave hospitals (i.e., other
ey actors within the TIS) the opportunity to purchase the drug
irectly from the manufacturer (Hedgecoe, 2004) and dedicated
urther resources toward implementing an Expanded Access Pro-
ram (EAP) to give 168 patients Herceptin® free of charge (Miles
nd Wroath, 2001) (Table 3).
These two  highly strategic and effective system-building activi-
ies deﬁnitely contributed to the habitualization of the technology.
owever, they did not necessarily create sufﬁcient awareness and
egitimacy that hospitals would be motivated to change their exist-
ng treatment routines for breast cancer patients after the drug
as covered by the NHS. Because of British reservedness and
ecause innovative drugs had not achieved legitimacy, hospitals
n England tended to adopt new practices more slowly in gen-
ral (Cancer charity representative b). Therefore, because, at the
eginning of 2000, many doctors had no idea what personalized
edicine was about or what “expression of HER2” means, nor
id they understand the molecular pathways involved in cancer
Cancer charity representative b), Roche started a public aware-
ess campaign and initiated meetings with oncology specialists
rom different hospitals across the country (i.e., system building
imed at changing cognitive and normative institutions) (Public
ealth professional c). Engaging in knowledge diffusion to ensure
hat oncologists and pathologists in hospitals received and under-
tood all the information was a massive project (Industry executive
). The company also set up meetings with patient organizations
Kent, 2000) (Table 3) and published the data about trial out-
omes widely (Industry executive e), as part of its efforts to spread
nowledge about Herceptin® broadly and reach out to the medical
ommunity.
The launching of Herceptin® coincided with the period when
ccess to information on the Internet improved substantially. Roche
ade use of this emerging medium and set up a Herceptin® web-
ite (Table 3). Therefore the source of information became more
rofessional and trustworthy, which substantially improved the
issemination and quality of information (Industry executive d).
s one of the oncologists interviewed (Oncologist m)  put it: “peo-
le come absolutely equipped... they have done their background
eading, so we can have a serious conversation about risk and 45 (2016) 1558–1569 1563
beneﬁts about the approach rather than spending a lot of time on
some of the more simple of aspects of it.”
Even though Roche acted as a powerful system builder (and
institutional entrepreneur), it also collaborated with other actors
by hiring a public relations company to market Herceptin® in the
UK as a whole (Lepper, 2001) (Table 3).
4.1.1. Implementation of HER2 testing
Because HER2 protein overexpression occurs in only 25–30%
of breast cancer patients (Slamon et al., 2001), detection of HER2
status (i.e., overexpression) in a tumor and identiﬁcation of the
patients who  might beneﬁt from the drug are prerequisites for
prescription of the drug (NICE, 2002). Breast tumors were already
analyzed for HER2 even before Herceptin® was developed, because
the overexpression of this protein correlates to resistance to certain
types of chemotherapy and to a higher probability of recurrence
(Burstein, 2005). Therefore HER2 was considered a legitimate pro-
gnostic factor in the global oncology community (Ménard et al.,
2001), but that was often not the case in England (Hedgecoe, 2004).
Before Herceptin® was  approved for use, Roche analyzed the
future market and found that at hospitals in the UK only 6% of
the patients with metastatic breast cancer were tested for HER2,
whereas in other large European countries, the rate was six- to
sevenfold higher (Enzing et al., 2006). One explanation for the
resistance to testing was ﬁnancial concerns (Enzing et al., 2006).
Some sources have pointed to the lack of skilled staff in hospi-
tals (House of Commons, 2005) and to a general clinical attitude
(House of Commons, 2005), in which clinicians in hospitals are
cautious to prescribe drugs with lower scientiﬁc legitimacy that
are associated with possible unknown side effects. Therefore cog-
nitive institutions faced problems because of the lack of legitimacy
and the generally conservative attitude among the medical com-
munity, which inhibited the willingness of oncologists to prescribe
the drug (Cancer charity representative b; Oncologist f). In England
at the beginning of 2000, one might say that hospitals did not have
enough knowledge diffusion between the oncology and pathology
communities. Thus the testing of the different biomarkers was not
performed in a comprehensive and cost-effective way and lacked
coordination. The entrance of Herceptin® in 2000 kicked off the
debate over personalized medicine and testing of the biomarkers
(Public health professional c).
Because, in personalized medicine, use of the drug and the diag-
nostic testing are highly co-dependent, it was clear to Roche that a
change in testing habits (i.e., in cognitive institutions) was needed
and HER2 tests had to become part of routine testing for cancer
patients in hospitals. Hospitals became active partners with the
company in biomarker diagnosis. Two years before Herceptin® was
launched, Roche allocated resources to help three hospitals set up
HER2 testing. With support from Roche, Nottingham City Hospital,
Glasgow Royal Inﬁrmary, and Royal Marsden Hospital in London
provided free HER2 testing for all breast cancer patients in the coun-
try (Ellis et al., 2000; Marsh, 2001) (Table 3), and the test results
at these hospital laboratories were freely available to all labora-
tories in the country (Ellis et al., 2000). According to one of the
experts interviewed (Pathologist o): “if Roche had not paid for the
diagnostics, the uptake would have been a lot slower.”
After almost two  years after the EMA  gave Herceptin® the
green light, the NICE eventually published its guidance on the
drug, and Herceptin® was  included in NHS coverage (NICE, 2002)
(Fig. 1). This period during which Herceptin® was introduced on
the English market can be characterized by Roche’s strategically
planned system-building activities. Many of them were resource-by familiarizing hospitals and patients with the innovative drug,
changing the existing treatment and testing routines in hospitals,
and, last but not least, obtaining market approval for Herceptin®
1564 P. Kukk et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 1558–1569
Table 3
System-building activities regarding Herceptin® (1999–2002).
System building for Herceptin® and HER2 testing by the manufacturer Knowledge diffusion Market formation Resource allocation Creation of legitimacy
Enabling the hospitals to buy the drug directly from the producer x
Implementation of Expanded Access Program x
Meetings with medical specialists and patient organizations x
Setting up the Herceptin® website x
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Sponsoring centers for HER2 testing (Nottingham City Hospital, Glasgow
Royal Inﬁrmary and London Royal Marsden Hospital)
Table 3). These aims were achieved mostly by activities that
ould be categorized as three system functions: allocating resources,
nvesting heavily in knowledge diffusion, and trying to gain legitimacy
or its innovative drug. However, it is important to note that, even
hough overcoming the regulatory barriers to gain market access
or Herceptin® was problematic, during this ﬁrst period none of the
ystem-building activities directly targeted regulatory institutional
hange; rather, they were directed at normative and cognitive insti-
utions.
.2. Herceptin® for early-stage breast cancer: Changing
nstitutions
The second period started with a different systemic setting from
he ﬁrst. Knowledge diffusion about Herceptin® had already been
ccomplished, and medical specialists in the hospitals and patient
roups involved in this IS were familiar with this new technology,
herefore using the drug had already become routine. The key actors
eemed certain that the drug would gain access to the market. Now
he main goal was to change the institutional structure through
ifferent system-building activities in order to accelerate adoption
f the drug (Table 4).
At the American Society of Clinical Oncologist (ASCO) meeting
n 2005, research evidence was presented showing that the use of
erceptin® in patients with early-stage HER2 breast cancer not only
educes the risk of recurrence but also increases progression-free
urvival (Piccart-Gebhart et al., 2005; Tuma, 2005). This was  the
rst – and powerful – evidence that Herceptin® could help patients
ot only at a late stage but also at an early stage of the disease.
round that time, the Department of Health published a policy goal
o bring cancer treatment at English hospitals up to a level that was
omparable to that at the best hospitals in other European countries
y 2010 (Department of Health, 2004) (Table 4).
The patient groups acted rapidly on this promising news,
ecause at that time women at English hospitals with a diagno-
is of early-stage breast cancer were not commonly tested for HER2
Pharmaceutical Field, 2008). The group “Fighting for Herceptin”
ubmitted a petition to the Prime Minister Tony Blair to increase
able 4
ystem building activities regarding Herceptin® (2002–2006).
System building for Herceptin® and HER2 testing Ma
form
Petition by a group “Fighting for Herceptin” 
Policy goal by the The Department of Health to improve cancer treatment in
England
Directive by The Department of Health to have all early-stage breast cancer
patients tested for HER2
x
Collaboration between Roche and Cancer Networks to support HER2 testing x
Collaboration between Roche and cancer charities 
Survey about low access to Herceptin® published by CancerBackup 
“Dossier of delay” published by CancerBackup 
Fly-In events at Westminster organized by Breakthrough Breast Cancer x
Report by Karolinska Institute highlighted low access to Herceptin® x
Collaboration with opinion leaders to raise awareness about Herceptin®
Demand to change the NICE assessment procedure by high level politicians x
the legitimacy of Herceptin® by demanding access to it for the treat-
ment of early-stage breast cancer (Mayor, 2005b) (Table 4). At the
time, however, the drug was not yet licensed in Europe for that use,
and PCTs were left to decide whether the drug should be prescribed
and paid for by local PCTs in individual cases.
Soon after Herceptin® was placed on the political agenda,
the Department of Health issued a directive that required all
the women  with early-stage breast cancer to be tested for HER2
(Dowsett et al., 2007). This had a positive effect on the creation of
the market for the drug (Table 4).
It was  clear that after Herceptin® entered the market as a treat-
ment for early-stage breast cancer, the demand for HER2 testing in
hospitals would increase (Dowsett et al., 2007). As one of the inter-
viewees (Health economist n) described it: “If the company would
not pay for the test, it would have to be covered by the NHS,” The
NHS, however, did not have the resources to pay for yearly tests for
HER2 for more than 40,000 patients (Pharmaceutical Field, 2008).
Roche took advantage of the NHS’s Cancer Networks (Hedgecoe,
2004) to change testing habits and implement wide-scale HER2
testing for early-stage breast cancer. The company hired a health-
care consultant that started a collaboration with all the hospitals in
each Cancer Network, supporting them by training staff, extend-
ing general funding, donating HER2 diagnostic kits, or all three
(Pharmaceutical Field, 2008). As one of the experts interviewed
(Pathologist o) said: “Roche was  assisting the testing, to make sure
it was correct; it did not help them at all if people were put on
Herceptin® incorrectly and it certainly did not help anyone if it was
all wrong.” The goal was to overcome the difﬁculties presented by
the expected increase in demand for HER2 testing (Kanter, 2005).
Therefore, Roche invested around £1.5 million in the NHS to imple-
ment HER2 testing at hospitals (Kanter, 2005). This kind of resource
allocation contributed heavily to changing cognitive institutions
regarding HER2 testing in England.
Several cancer charities and patient advocacy groups became
allies of Roche in gaining public attention for Herceptin® (Table 4).
CancerBackup, a forceful supporter of Herceptin®, has declared
publicly that in 2005 it received £29,000 in funding from Roche
(Templeton, 2006). That same year, Breast Cancer Care received
rket
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80,000 from Roche (Kelly, 2006). No information is available as to
hether it inﬂuenced the independence of these organizations.
Unlike drug companies, the charities can lobby publicly for a
aster system of approval, which implies regulatory institutional
hange (Boseley, 2006). Therefore, the breast cancer patient advo-
acy groups were most vocal in their support for Roche to reach out
o a wider public and politicians to gain faster access to Herceptin®
Boseley, 2006), which put additional pressure on the government
o grant the drug market access. According to one of the interview-
es (Oncologist m):  “I have no doubt that they [the charities] have
een very signiﬁcant.... the breast cancer lobby was  very very loud....
hey made a tremendous effort in terms of public information.”
CancerBackup published a survey, conducted by Roche, that
ighlighted the low access to Herceptin® (Boseley, 2006). It
lso compiled a “dossier of delay,” a list of 12 drugs, including
erceptin®, that needed to be made available for patients via fast-
rack approval instead of the standard procedure, which could be
engthy (Editorial, 2005) (Table 4). Because breast cancer was  an
ssue of the moment, it also became an interesting topic for politi-
ians so that they could express their support and make it a priority
n the public health political agenda in England (Clarke, 2007).
reakthrough Breast Cancer organized a series of events at West-
inster that were co-sponsored by Roche (Breakthrough Breast
ancer, 2012) to gain further legitimacy and to address members
f Parliament about Herceptin® (Table 4).
In addition to working with patient advocacy groups, Roche
lso sponsored academic socioeconomic studies. In 2005 Karolin-
ka Institute in Sweden published a report funded by a grant from
oche that pointed out the low access to personalized cancer drugs
hroughout the UK (Wilking and Jönsson, 2005) (Table 4). Roche
lso indirectly targeted individuals who enjoyed high regard in
ociety to gain their support and raise awareness of Herceptin®
Boseley, 2006).
In September 2005, the NICE issued a press release that was
ikely a reaction to the enormous political and public pressure
reated by Roche’s allies—that is, patients and advocacy groups.
he agency describes ongoing discussions over a regulatory insti-
utional change to allow faster appraisal of important new drugs
NICE, 2005a). A month later, after substantial pressure from
atients and charities, the health secretary issued a press release
aying: “I want the licence for Herceptin® to be granted as quickly as
ossible, without compromising people’s safety, and to be available
ithin weeks of the (European) licence being given” (Department
f Health, 2005). The pressure had reached the point that she also
emanded a change in the formal institutions: “and I have asked
he NICE to start on a fast-track appraisal of the use of Herceptin
n parallel with the licensing process so that they can issue their
uidelines to the NHS on Herceptin within weeks of the licence
eing given” (Hewitt, 2005).
Prime Minister Tony Blair stood behind his colleagues in these
xceptional circumstances by making a statement few weeks later
bout Herceptin®, suggesting that all PCTs should “go ahead and
llow people to use it” (BBC, 2005) (Table 4).
Under enormous pressure from politicians and the media, on
ovember 3, 2005, the change in regulatory institutions took place
s the NICE announced the launching of a fast-track assessment
rocess called “Single Technology Appraisal” (STA) for assessing
erceptin® and other potentially life-saving drugs to “enable single
ew drugs, and existing drugs with new indications to be rapidly
ssessed” (NICE, 2005b). This rapid assessment procedure created
n opportunity for the NICE to issue its guidance up to six months
arlier than before (NICE, 2005b).In February 2006, Roche submitted its Herceptin® application
o the EMA  (Roche, 2006a). On April 28, 2006, the EMA  announced
ts approval of the drug (EMA, 2006), only 10 weeks after the appli-
ation had been submitted (Dyer, 2006), and, at the end of May, the 45 (2016) 1558–1569 1565
European Commission ofﬁcially authorized the use of Herceptin®
in the treatment of early-stage breast cancer (Roche, 2006b) (Fig. 1).
Next, Roche submitted relevant Herceptin® data to the NICE
(Roche, 2006c). The STA of Herceptin® did not start after the licens-
ing decision but took place in parallel with the EMA  process. On
June 9, the NICE published a positive draft guidance for Herceptin®
(NICE, 2006)—having done so in record time, just two weeks after
the EU wide license had been granted.
This was  an exceptional result, as no other cancer drug had pre-
viously proﬁted from this new simpliﬁed and fast-track approval
system, and Herceptin® became the ﬁrst cancer drug ever assessed
using the STA procedure at the NICE. This long-awaited decision
gave oncologists the legitimacy to start prescribing the drug, con-
ﬁdent of coverage by the NHS.
5. Theoretical implications
The purpose of this article is to provide insights in different
system-building patterns that support institutional change by a
powerful actor in a TIS.
This work allows us to understand how actors overcame dif-
ﬁculties involved in introducing a new technology in a highly
institutionalized health-care environment. Our empirical evidence
indicates that the activities of a key system builder can have a major
impact on a TIS with respect to institutional structures and over-
all system dynamics. In order to better understand this impact on
system building regarding Herceptin®, let us take a closer analyti-
cal look at our ﬁndings. We  start with answering our ﬁrst research
question:
Research Question 1: Which system-building activities did the
key actors undertake to facilitate market approval and diffusion of
their technologies?
At the beginning, during the habitualization step, knowl-
edge diffusion was underdeveloped and general knowledge about
Herceptin® and its usefulness was low among patient groups and
the medical community at hospitals. Because the drug lacked regu-
latory approval, it also had no legitimate users: medical specialists
could not prescribe it for breast cancer patients. As we  illustrated in
Fig. 2, Roche focused its system-building activities on establishing
cognitive and normative institutions in order to gain preliminary
acceptance for its technology and to increase the level of knowledge
among the key adopters (i.e., patients and hospitals), which would
thereafter help to facilitate the increase in demand for the drug. The
company also invested in knowledge diffusion at hospitals by set-
ting up one-on-one meetings with oncologists, organizing events to
raise awareness of Herceptin®, publishing the results of the clinical
trials in professional journals, and even hiring a professional public
relations agency to facilitate many of these processes. As a con-
sequence, knowledge diffusion among the medical community at
hospitals increased rapidly. This changed the role of hospitals from
being merely service providers to being collaboration partners with
Roche: thanks to active dialog between breast cancer patients and
oncologists about the improved treatment options that Herceptin
could offer, hospitals carried out an enormous amount of knowl-
edge diffusion among patients and contributed to legitimization of
the drug.
After the diffusion of knowledge improved and legitimacy was
gained within the medical community at hospitals, the willingness
to employ this new technology lagged because of the lack of access
to it. The investment in knowledge diffusion had been success-
ful: demand by medical specialists and patient communities was
created (cognitive institution). However, further system-building
processes had to take place to satisfy this demand (see Fig. 3). Before
2002, creation of the market lagged behind, because the drug had
neither approval nor funding. Roche overcame this situation by
starting with speciﬁc system-building activities that required vast
1566 P. Kukk et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 1558–1569
Fig. 2. Overview of the key processes involved in institutional change in the Herceptin® TIS (adapted from Scott, 2001; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).Different system-building
processes based on the current case (in green) are illustrated in the ﬁgure. The arrows 
changes proposed by Scott (2001) and Tolbert and Zucker (1996). (For interpretation of th
of  this article.)
Fig. 3. The interdependence of key processes involved in the Herceptin® TIS based
on  the empirical ﬁndings in this study. At the beginning, knowledge diffusion was
needed in order to increase knowledge in the community, which leads to an increase
in  demand. Thereafter, additional resources are needed to satisfy the increased
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problems with the existing cancer therapies and supported patientemand, which eventually leads to institutional change. Changed institutions are
n  favor of new technology, which encourages further knowledge creation.
esources. Two incentives (the Extended Access Program and the
otential for hospitals to purchase the drug directly from the man-
facturer) made the drug available for a number of patients. Here,
gain, hospitals were Roche’s key partners in creating a market for
ts drug. The hospitals served as further hubs of knowledge and
arket creation for Herceptin® by paying for the drug out of their
wn budgets and offering their infrastructure and medical special-
sts, thus enabling access to the drug for breast cancer patients.
he role of hospitals is even more signiﬁcant, as the diffusion of
he Herceptin® depends heavily on the availability of appropriate
iagnostic tests. Roche collaborated with three hospitals to set up
ER2 testing centers to provide free tests to all laboratories in the
ountry.
When the technology was ﬁrst launched on the market, Roche
ngaged in a number of different system-building activities tar-
eted at knowledge creation and diffusion among the main users of
he technology (i.e., hospitals), which thereafter became important
llies of the company in further market creation for the tech-
ology. These activities also involved the allocation of enormous
esources by the key entrepreneur, which highlights the impor-
ance of resources not only in developing technologies but also in
heir later diffusion.indicate how these different system-building activities inﬂuence the institutional
e references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version
The answer to Research Question 2 helps us to understand how
the institutional changes were manifested in the Herceptin® TIS.
Research Question 2: How did the key actors deal with institu-
tions that inﬂuenced their technology, and which strategies did
they implement together with other stakeholders to shape the
institutional structures in the interest of their goal?
Because pharmaceuticals have one of the world’s most highly
institutionalized markets, we expected that institutions would
have a big role in market formation in the Herceptin® TIS. We
therefore included the concepts involving institutional change in
our analysis so that we could identify – in addition to general sys-
tem building – more institutional entrepreneur-type activities and
how the actors dealt with institutions that were inﬂuenced their
technology.
When we analyzed our empirical ﬁndings, it became apparent
that the entire system-building process involved in the Herceptin®
TIS is strongly related to institutional change, because the key actor
invested massive resources in different processes to change estab-
lished institutions (Fig. 2).
While preparing for Herceptin® to receive approval as a treat-
ment for early-stage breast cancer, Roche had no legitimacy that
it could use to directly support the adoption of the technology
(e.g., gain rapid access to the market) despite its strong interest in
institutional change. Therefore additional collaborations emerged
(as shown in Fig. 2). The coalition of different actors with various
interests and backgrounds did not emerge spontaneously to advo-
cate for the rapid adoption of Herceptin®. Roche supported various
actors in addition to hospitals, which shared a common interest
with the company in bringing the drug to market more rapidly by
changing regulatory institutions (i.e., the NICE’s assessment pro-
cedure). Obviously, the ability to gain allies depends heavily on
the social position and ﬁnancial resources of the entrepreneur.
Therefore cooperation is desired with different actors, depending
on the precise type of institutional change it intends to pursue
(Perkmann and Spicer, 2007). Previous literature indicates that the
success of institutional entrepreneurs depends heavily on their var-
ious resources and the management of those resources in order to
carry out institutional change (Fligstein, 1997). The powerful insti-
tutional entrepreneur started supporting HER2 testing facilities for
the treatment of early-stage breast cancer, which would enable
rapid adoption of the drug after it received approval and access to
the market. Roche also sponsored academic studies that underlinedadvocacy groups and other organizations, which in turn inﬂuenced
the media. The company also helped patients inform the public
about the restricted access to Herceptin® and pressured politicians
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o get involved in the process. All these strategic activities, initiated
y Roche but carried out by its allies, eventually led to institutional
hange: implementation of the fast-track drug approval process by
he NICE (see Fig. 2).
Roche was  a very powerful actor that tried to inﬂuence the
ational regulatory environment almost singlehandedly. However,
t also became apparent that even a very powerful institutional
ntrepreneur must depend on other actors in an innovation sys-
em that play a different role in society and are better positioned
o drive the change needed. We  highlight the role of hospitals as
ey adaptors, whose willingness to adopt this novel biomedical
echnology played a key role in the initial creation of the market
or Roche’s drug. The knowledge diffusion among medical spe-
ialists at hospitals about the drug and the testing was the main
equirement; on top of this, a change in treatment and diagnostic
outines (cognitive institutions) served as a ﬁrst step in further sys-
em building. Therefore this case study shows the key importance
f changing the routines of key adopters in favor of the new tech-
ology. The study also illustrates that institutional entrepreneurs
annot always change the institutions directly and have to dedicate
heir resources strategically, rather than allocating them for other
ystem-building activities that do not directly target institutions.
e conclude that the company could not have done everything by
tself and still had to put other actors in place, collaborate, and build
onnections and networks, in order to build up the pressure that
ulminated in institutional change. Even though it had many allies
nd they played their role, they were initially put in this position
y an institutional entrepreneur that needed efforts by others and
reatly inﬂuenced their activities.
From the perspective of institutional entrepreneurship, none
f the resource-intensive system-building activities highlighted
bove can be categorized as institutional change. However, even
hough they did not explicitly target institutional change, they were
rucial in the adoption of the technology and served as prepara-
ory steps for achieving critical mass and gaining momentum that
roved to be critical in realizing institutional change. Therefore,
nderstanding institutional change in relation to innovation ben-
ﬁts from insights in other forms of system building that do not
xplicitly target institutional change.
. Conclusions
This study contributes to our understanding of actor strategies
nvolved in system building in a technological innovation system
TIS) and, more speciﬁcally, in institutional change that creates
 more favorable environment for the adoption of an emerging
iomedical technology.
It analyzed how system builders deal with institutions that are
ot beneﬁcial to their technology and activities they undertake in
rder to shape the institutional structures that are important for
he innovation system.
The empirical focus was on the pharmaceutical company Roche,
hich acted as a system builder and institutional entrepreneur in
uilding a new TIS in England: the personalized medicine to treat
reast cancer Herceptin®.
The paper shows that a single powerful company, which acts
s a system builder and an institutional entrepreneur, can have
 major impact on system dynamics in general and can be of key
mportance in creating and changing institutions. While facing
he systemic hurdles that are not beneﬁcial to its technology, the
ntrepreneur can apply different system-building approaches (e.g.,
esource allocation, knowledge diffusion, creation of legitimacy,
arket creation) alone or in collaboration with other involved
takeholders that all establish a groundwork, eventually leading
o institutional change in order to strategically shape and improve
he performance of the TIS in a highly regulated institutional 45 (2016) 1558–1569 1567
environment. Indeed, the activities of Roche and its allies led to
two major institutional changes: the implementation of regular
HER2 testing as a cognitive institution and a change in regulatory
institutions and the STA procedure, which signiﬁcantly improved
market access to personalized cancer drugs, such as Herceptin®.
This paper focused on a very resourceful entrepreneur and how
it engaged in system-building activities in which demand for the
technology was well articulated: breast cancer is a disease with one
of the world’s most powerful patient lobbies. Because Herceptin®
was the ﬁrst drug of its kind in clinical practice, a great deal of hope
was associated with it among the hospital community and patient
groups. In this respect, it is a unique case, as the timing and the
push for market creation by a powerful manufacturer, combined
with equally strong technology pull by main adopters, played out
very well for overall system building in the TIS. This eventually led
to institutional change. In this case, the preconditions for successful
system building were exceptionally good and should, thus, not be
seen as representative of the conditions that exist for other new
medical technologies for different diseases backed by less powerful
manufacturers or for diseases with a lower “social proﬁle” than
breast cancer.
This work also contributes to the literature on TIS. We  demon-
strate that, even though institutions are central in the structure of
innovation systems, their role in the key processes could be empha-
sized more to clarify the dynamics of TIS. Therefore a functional
analysis should pay more attention to processes related to “institu-
tional change,” especially in highly regulated markets. One possible
avenue for future research is for the TIS community to focus more
on “institutional change,” so that it becomes more central to future
development of the theory of TIS.
The stronger focus on institutional change in TIS functional
analysis brings us also closer to institutional entrepreneurship lit-
erature, which is explicitly dedicated to studying the activities of
actors who have an interest in speciﬁc institutional arrangements.
Second, by studying a highly regulated market, we illustrate
that insights from different system-building activities (e.g., knowl-
edge diffusion, resource allocation, the creation of legitimacy, the
formation of networks) that help to create a critical mass are
key to institutional change in a TIS. Therefore, in order to better
understand institutional change, we  also need to understand which
system-building activities act as a groundwork for it. The activities
that do not target institutional change could be researched further
in future research. Also, we demonstrate that even a very power-
ful institutional entrepreneur cannot carry out institutional change
by itself, and therefore other actors must be included to complete
the tasks that the institutional entrepreneur cannot carry out on its
own.
Our work also has social relevance for policy initiatives that sup-
port the development of emerging technologies. We have learned
that user practices and routines in hospitals change gradually and
are characterized by a great deal of inertia. In addition to being
service providers in health innovation systems and participating in
clinical trials in drug development, hospitals play a key role in cre-
ating legitimacy for new biomedical technologies that contribute to
overall adoption in the health-care system. Massive resources are
needed from private companies not just to develop the technology
but also to ensure that medical specialists (both oncologists and
pathologists) in hospitals are familiar with the new technologies
and have the competence to use it. Under these conditions, in
which new business models are required to develop drugs, which
may  call for new kinds of diagnostic testing and which differ from
established technologies, policy makers may  ﬁnd it challenging to
adapt institutions and to develop optimal policies that are appro-
priate to the needs of the modern health-care system. We  therefore
think that a ﬂexible approach regarding regulation would be ben-
eﬁcial. This would support innovation without compromising the
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fﬁciency and safety of the drugs. Until now, the TIS framework
as not been fully able to explain institutional change and the role
t plays in market formation in a highly regulated environment.
mphasizing institutional change in the TIS functional analysis
ould facilitate the development of a TIS framework that can meet
he needs of policy makers in developing optimal policy strategies
or emerging technologies to a greater degree.
As an explorative case study of a single ﬁrm, this work clearly
as limitations regarding the generalizability of results. This work
s about a speciﬁc TIS in one country, in which we use institutional
hange literature to draw more insights regarding system-building
ynamics and mechanisms. Future research should explore cases
n areas with less regulation to determine whether any of our
bservations are applicable in settings other than biomedical inno-
ation and whether different strategies emerge for an institutional
ntrepreneur with fewer resources. Moreover, the role of hospi-
als has been downplayed until now in TIS studies. Future research
hould further investigate hospitals to gain a better understand-
ng of their role in the adoption of personalized medicine and the
ssociated diagnostic testing. Future studies could also shed light
n how the adoption of personalized medicine has been handled in
ther countries and whether any system-building patterns emerge
hat could be used in further theory building by the academic
ommunity.
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